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(S. F. Nos. 17263, 17264. In Bank. Feb. 18, 1947.] 
ROSEMARY PROPERTIES, INC. (a Corporation), Re-
spondent, v. CHARLES J. McCOLGAN, as Franchise 
Tax Commissioner, ete., Appellant. 
(Two Cases.) 
[1] OorporatiolUl- I'ranchise 'lu - DeducttolUl-Dlvldendl.-In 
the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tu Act, t 8(h), as 
amended in 1937 (State. 1937, p. 2328; Deering's Gen. Laws, 
1937, Act 8488), permitting a. deductioD of "dividends . . • 
declared from income which has been included in the measure 
of the tax . • 'I" the word "income" refers to gross income 
subject to taxation by the state, from which it follows that 
a dividend paid from "earnings ane! profits" attn'butable to 
California sources woule! be deductible. 
[2] Id. - Franchise 'lax - DeductiolUl-Divldends.-In the Bank 
and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, 18(h), as amended in 
1939 (Stats. 1939, p. 2942; Deering's Gen. La'WS, 1939 Supp., 
Act 8488), permitting the deduction of dividmds declared 
"from income which has. been taxed under the provisions of 
the Corporation Tax Act of 1937 to the corporation declaring 
the dividends," the word "income" is to be construed in the 
same manner as the word in the 1937 amendment, as meaning 
gross income. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. Leon E. Gray, Judge. Affirmed. 
Actions to recover additional franchise taxes paid under 
protest. Judgments for plaintiff affirmed. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, John L. Nourse and 
James E. Sabine, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant. 
Latham '" Watkins and Austin H. Peek, lr., for Re-
spondent. 
Mackay, McGregor'" Reynolds and Martin I. Wen, as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
[1] See 6A OaLJur. 1632. 
Kelt. Die. Beference: [1, 2] Corporations, 1913. 
, . 
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SPENCE, J.-Two actions were brought by plaintiff to 
recover additional franchise taxes assessed by defendant 
against plaintiff for the years 1938 and 1939, respectively. 
They. were tried upon a stipulated set of facts, and they have 
been briefed together on appeal in presenting a problem of 
statutory construction affecting the propriety of a dividend 
deduetion for franchise tax purposes for the two yea,rs in 
question, under the terms of the Bank and Corporation Fran-
chise Tax Act (Stats. 1929, ch. 13, p. 19; as amended; Deer-
ing's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 8488), hereinafter referred to a!il 
"the act." The trial court entered a judgment in favor of 
plaintiff in each case and from said judgments. defendant 
has appealed. 
Plainti1f, a California corporation, duly filed its franchise 
tax returns for the years 1938 and 1939, the former based on 
its 1937 income and the latter on its 1938 income. Plaintiff's 
report of gross income for these successive years listed $76,195 
and $83,545 as dividends paid to it respectively in 1937 and 
1938 by the Ventura Land and Water Company, hereinafter 
referred to as "Ventura." However, in computing its net 
income for francht~ tax purposes for those years, plaintiff 
deducted the full amount of the respective Ventura dividends 
from its returns. As a result of that deduction and other de-
ductions not here involved, plaintiff reported a net loss for 
each year and paid a minimum tax of $25 on each of its re-
turns as required by section 4(3) of the act. 
Indue season defendant served notices on plaintiff of his 
intention to assess an additional franchise tax for each of the 
two years. Plaintiff protested the proposed assessments but 
paid them with interest, after which these actions followed 
to recover the additional assessments charged and collected by 
defendant by reason of his adjustment of the Ventura divi-
dend deduction taken by plaintiff on each of its returns. This 
disputed item will determine whether or not plaintiff's fran-
chise tax obligation for each of the two years exceeds the 
minimum $25 assessment as originally reported. In order to 
appraise the factors, in controversy, it is necessary to examine 
the franchise tax returns filed by Ventura for the correspond. 
ing years. 
Ventura, a California corporation, conducted its entire busi-
ness in this state. Its principal source of income was royal-
ties from California oil and gas properties, which it owned 
and leased to operating oil producers. Ventura's gross income 
) 
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for the year 1937 -as reported on its 1938 return-was $1,203,-
295.60 and for the year 193"~ reported on its 1939 return 
-was $1,417,090.48, of which sums $1,195,768.97 and $1,399,-
534.92 were derived, respectively, from its oil royalties. Prior 
to 1937 Ventura had recovered in full its cost depletion for its 
oil-bearing lands. But in pursuance of section 8(g) of the 
act, which authorizes a deduction for depletion at the rate 
of 27lh percent of the gross income from oil and gas wells, . 
Ventura listed, and was allowed, on its respective returns n 
deduction of $328,836.47 from its oil royalties for 1937 and 
a deduction of $384.872.10 from its oil royalties for 1938. 
These respective percentage depletions on its oil· royalties and 
other allowable deductions reduced Ventura's net income for 
franchise tax purposes for 1937 to $775,282.65 and for 1938 
to $908,171.54. It was stipulated that Ventura's earnings and 
profits for the year 1937 amounted to $963,338.63 and for the 
year 1938 amounted to $1,112,147.82, from which sums came 
the respective dividends of $76,195 and $83,545 paid plainti1f. 
As the basis for the additional franchise tax assessments 
against plaintiff, defendant claims that only 80.478 per cent 
of the dividend paid in 1937 and 81.659 per cent of the divi-
dend paid in 1938 were included in the measure of the tax 
imposed by the act on Ventura. Defendant obtains these per-
centages by dividing Ventura's net income for the year in 
question by its earnings and profits for the same period. The 
two figures differ because of the factors taken into account: 
thus, the oil depletion allowance which entered into the com-
putation of Ventura's net income was a statutory percentage 
deduction but such item did not affect Ventura's schedule of 
earnings and profits since depletion sustained on a cost basis 
had already been recovered in previous years; and disburse-
ments such as those made for federal income tax and fran-
chise tax charges. which reduced the amount of Ventura's 
earnings and profits, did not affect the net income computa-
tion because not deductible under the act. (§ 8Cc),) So-
according to defendant-Ventura's net income of $775,282.65 
divided by its earnings and profits of $963,338.63 gives the 
percentage of 80.478, which multiplied by plaintift's dividend 
of $76,195 represents the proper dividend deduction to be 
allowed plaintiff for 1937; and Ventura's net income of 
$908,171.54 divided by its en1'Ilin~ and profits of $1,112.147.82 
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dividend of $83,545 represents the proper dividend deduction 
to be allowed plaintiff for 1938. 
Since plaintiff contends that the entire Ventura dividend 
received in 1937 and 1938 was deductible for franchise tax 
purposes in its respective returns as having been declared 
by Ventura from income "included in the measure of the 
tax" imposed by the act on Ventura, it is necessary to con-
strue the language of the act to determine plaintiff's liability 
for the additional taxes assessed and collected by defendant 
under the above formula. 
Section 4(3) requires that every corporation doing busi-
ness within this state and not expressly exempted from taxa-
tion by the Constitution shall annually pay, for the privilege 
of exercising its corporate franchise, lia tax according to or 
measured by its net income, to be computed ••• at the rate 
of four per centum upon the basis of its net income for the 
next preceding fiscal or calendar year." 
Section 7 defines "net income" as "gross income less the 
deductions allowed." Section 8 enumerates the allowable 
deductions. Among the items 80 listed is the dividend deduc-
tion under subdivision (h), the premise of the parties' eli&-
pute. Applicable to plaintiff's 1938 return is the provision 
for the deduction in the subdivision as amended in 1937 
(Stats. 1937, p. 2328): "Dividends received during the in-
come year from a bank or corporation doing business in this 
state declared from income which 1uu been incZuded in the 
measure of the ta3: imposed by this act upon the bank or cor-
poration declaring the dividends." (Italics ours.) Appli-
cable to plaintiiI's 1939 return is the provision for the deduc-
tion in the subdivision as amended in 1939 (Stats. 1939, 
p. 2942): "Dividends received during the income year de-
clared from income which has been included in tM m6tJ.tUf'e 
of the ta3: imposed by this act upon the bank or corporation 
declaring the dividends, or from income which has been 
taxed under the provisions of the Corporation Income Tax 
Act of 1937 to the corporation declaring the dividcmds.". 
(Italics ours.) 
The import of the above italicized language carried into 
the respective amendments of section 8(h) here applicable 
is the pivotal point in controversy. Defendant's arguments 
rest on these steps: (1) That under fundamental principles 
of tax law as well as by statutory provision in the act itself 
since 1939, dividends are defined to be "any distribution made 
) 
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by a corporation to its shareholders • • • out of its earnings 
or prouts" (Stats. 1939, p. 2936, § 6(c) (1); 33 C.J. 303, 
§ 78; Title 26, U.S.C.A., Internal Rev. Code, § 115}; (2) 
that the "earnings or prouts" of a corporation are generally 
not the same figure as its taxable net income because affected 
by di1ierent considerations-the former by the corporation's 
actusl expenditures, the latter by the allowable statutory de-
ductions; (3) that since the 80urce of dividends is "earnings 
or prouts," the word "income" as used in the allowable de-
duction of "dividends .•. declared from income which has 
been included in the measure of the tax" means "earnings or 
profits"; and 80 (4) where "earnings or prouts" exceed "net 
income," then "it follows as a mathematical certainty that 
dividends declared from such earnings or prouts are declared 
from earnings or prouts which in part have not been included 
in the measure of the tax and the dividends are not fully 
deductible." Plaintiff does not dispute steps (1) and (2) 
of defendant's argument, but it does challenge their relevancy 
to the problem at hand and the logic of the concluding steps 
(3) and (4) in limiting the phrase "income which has been 
included in the measure of the tax" to mean no more than 
statutory net income. Rather, 80 plaintiff contends, the 
quoted phrase refers to "gross income subject to taxation by 
the state"; and since that item would include "earnings and 
profits" attributable to California sources, dividends paid 
therefrom would be "declared from income which has been 
included in the measure of the tax." A reasonable construc-
tion of the disputed language in relation to the basic concept 
of the act sustains plaintiff's position. 
[1] The tax in question is not one on income as such but 
one which the corporation must pay "for the privilege of 
exercising its corporate franchises within this state" (Matson 
Navigation Co. v. State Board of Equalization. 3 Cal.2d 1, 11 
[43 P.8d 805]) and "according to or measured by its net 
income." (§ 4(3).} AB the nature of the tax is distinguished, 
80 is its basis of calculation. Thus, the act uses the term "net 
income" to specify the sum which, when multiplied by the 
prescribed percentage rate, determines the amount of the 
franchise tax. In this sense "net income," as defined by the 
act, is the final measure by which the tax is computed. (San 
Joaquin Ginning Co. v. McColgan, 20 Cal. 2d 254, 256 [125 
P.2d 36].) Since "net income" means "gross income less 
the deductions allowed" (§ 7), these factors neeessariq. enter 
) 
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into the computation and are included in the measure of 
. the tax. The income involved is all income, including earn-
ings and profits, attributable to California sourcesj the deduc-
tions, including the prescribed depletion rate of 27% per· 
cent of gross income from oil and gas properties, are addi-
tional considerations. Following these principles, any divi-
dend paid from "earnings and profits"-an item of gross 
income entering, like the authorized deductions, into the de-
termination of net income-would be a dividend paid out of 
income included in the measure of the tax. As such the divi-
dend is exempt from franchise tax in the hands of the recipi-
ent corporation. 
This same conclusion was reached in the case of Burton 
B. Green In.,utment Co. v. McColgan, 60 Cal.App.2d 224 
[140 P.2d 451], with regard to a practically identical factual 
situation involving the application of section 8{h) in its 1937 
form. There the plaintiff taxpayer owned stock in Belridge 
Oil Company, a California corporation which during the 
year in question, 1937, derived all but a small portion of its 
income from the production and sale of oil and gas in this 
state. In its franchise tax return covering that year, Bel-
ridge Oil Company reported alZ its income and claimed the 
oil depletion allowance under section 8{g), which percentage 
depletion exceeded its actual cost depletion by a substantial 
amount. During 1937 Be1ridge Oil Company had paid to 
plaintiff certain dividends which plaintiff, in its appropriate 
franchise tax return, included in its gross income and then 
deducted under authority of section 8(h). In asserting an 
additional assessment against plaintiff, defelldant tax com-
missioner took the position that "because the 271h per cent 
of the gross income from the oil wells operated by Be1ridge 
exceeded the depletion deduction based upon actual cost, the 
excess of the deduction allowed over actUal cost depletion is 
not a part of income which had been included in the measure 
of the tax imposed, within the meaning of section 8{h)." 
(60 Cal.App.2d 230-231.) In rejecting this theory, the court 
said at pages 231-232: "If the total Belridge income for 1937 
was included in its gross income for franchise tax purposes 
and if out of its earnings of 1937 that corporation paid the 
dividend in question to plaintiff out of profits earned in that· 
year, it must follow that the entire dividend so paid to plain-
tiff was declared from income which had been included in 
the measure of the tax. If it was, then it was deductible in 
) 
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full. The very purpose of section 8 subdivision (h) is to 
avoid double taxation and thereby prevent the destruction 
of capital assets. While it aims to tax all income received as 
dividends (except those exempted by law) which have not 
been taxed while in the treasury of the dividend payor, at the 
same time it purposes to avoid the inclusion of the same in-
come in the measure of the tax to be paid by two or more 
different taxpayers. If the same dividend is included in the 
measure of the tax paid by two taxpayers successively under 
the Franchise Tax Act, the result is multiple taxtion." 
Defendant attacks the pertinency of the Green Investment 
Company ease because "it failed to take into consideration 
whether the earnings or profits of the declaring corporation 
out of which the dividends were declared were greater than 
the net income by which the tax on the declaring corporation 
had been measured." But such claim mistakenly assumes the 
relationship between "earnings and profits" and "statutory 
net income" to be a distinctive and controlling factor. In 
fact, this ratio involves no different considerations than were 
before the court in the Green Investment Company ease. It 
simply rests on the theory that to the extent Ventura's divi-
dends were declared from "earnings and profits" which ex-
ceeded in amount its "net income"--a difference wholly at-
tributable to Ventura's taking of the oil and gas statutory 
depletion allowance-such dividends were paid from an un-
taxed source, and so from income not "included in the meas-
ure of the tax." In the Green Investment Company case the 
same point was considered as presented with relation to the 
extent the statutory percentage depletion exceeded the cost 
depletion and the consequent argument that "a portion of 
the Belridge dividend was paid from an untaxed source." 
In declaring this argument to be based upon a fallacious con-
cept, the court aptly said at page 235: "Whether the amount 
of net income for the purpose of computing the franchise tax 
is increased or decreased by any adjustment which does not 
at the same time proportionately enlarge or diminish profits, 
it will not affect either the declaration of a dividend or the 
amount thereof. • • . Since • . . all of the Belridge income 
[including earnings and profits] was reported as gross in-
come, all of its dividends were from a fund which had been 
:flailed by the tax master," and therefore from "income which 
has been included in the measure of the tax." 
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The design of the act clearly contemplates the oil and gUlJ 
percentage depletion (§ 8(g» and thedh'idcnd cieduction 
(§ 8(h» as independent allowances to be taken by two sepa· 
rate corporations in the computation of their respective net 
incomes. Defendant attacks the propriety of a "percentage 
depletion [which] can go on and on after cost ••• has been 
completely recovered" by the oil operating company, but 
that is not a matter to be considered here. The procedure 
which defendant challenges is authorized by the act. Upon 
such premise it would appear that if the percentage deple· 
tion is properly deducted from gross income by the dividend 
declaring company in computing its net income for franchise 
tax purposes, it should not thereafter be assessed to the re-
cipient corporation in the latter's computation. Rather. a.'J 
the court succinctly stated in the Green Investment Company 
ease at page 234, "the recipient is authorized to deduct the 
dividend which has passed through the tax mill before its 
distribution by the declaring corporation." . 
A consideration of the legislative history of section 8 (h) 
lends additional force to plaintiff's position. As first enacted 
in 1929 (Stats. 1929, p. 23), section 8(h) provided for the 
deductibility of dividends "received during the taxable year 
from income arising out of business done in this state." Thi~ 
was construed to mean that it did not require dividends to 
arise out of business done in this state by the corporation 
which declared the dividends. Consequently, the deduction 
could be taken where the corporation paying the dividend 
was a foreign corporation and did no business in the !!tl1te 
but merely owned stock in corporations operating in Califor· 
nia from which it received income. (Corporation of America 
v. Johnson, 7 Ca1.2d 295, 299·300 [60 P.2d 417].) To correct 
this situation, section 8(h) was amended in 1933 (Stats. 1933, 
pp. 688-689) by adding the requirement that the declaring 
corporation must have done business in this state. At the 
same time there was inserted the further requirement that 
the declaring corporation must have been constitutionally 
taxable in this state. But the base of the deduction was still 
whether the dividend was declared from income "arising out 
of business done in this state." Under such statutory test, 
it is apparent that the propriety of plaintiff's claim to the full 
Ventura dividend deduction taken on its respective franchise 
tax returns could not be questioned. 
Then in 1937 section 8(h) was amended to incllH'te the 
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ing out of business done in this state" were deleted and the 
deduction of dividends was allowed when declared from in-
come "which has been included in the measure of the tax 
imposed by this act!' This new wording is significant in that 
coincident with its adoption the following provisions were 
eliminated from subdivisIon (h) as it read in 1933: (1) The 
allocation allowance applicable where dividends were declared 
from income "derived from business done within and without 
this state"; and (2) the reference to the inapplicability of 
the deduction to dividends paid by constitutionally tuG-
empt corporations. With its attention 80 foeused on the 
eliminated provisions, the Legislature in the 1937 amendment 
apparently considered them unnecessary in view of the new 
wording, briefer in form, as expressive of the purpose of the 
deduction to avoid double taxation. Thus the language "in-
come which has been included in the measure of the tu" ap-
pears to have a definite connection with the problem of allo-
cating income within and without the state; and appears to 
refer to income attributable to California sources. Such view 
of the 1937 amendment coincides With the original purpose 
of the dividend deduction and with the natural import of the 
words. (Of. Burton E. Green Investment Co. v. McColgan, 
B'Upra, 60 Cal.App.2d 232-233.) The substituted language 
furnishes no basis for assuming that it was intended thereby 
to establish a new scheme of tax deduction dependent upon 
a ratio between "earnings or profits" and "net income"-a 
view which would require, as defendant concedes, the inter-
pretation of the word "income" in the disputed phrase to 
mean "earnings or profits." Such interpretation not only 
creates a redundancy in that the word "dividend" itself im-
plies a distribution from "earnings or profits," but it also 
does violence to a cardinal principle of statutory construction 
in assigning a forced and strained meaning to a word con-
trary to its common understanding. (Corbett v. Cham'ber., 
10f) Cal. 178, 180 [41 P. 873]; I" re Alpine, 203 Cal. 731, 737 
[265 P. 947, 58 A.L.R. 1500]; County of Lo. Angeles v. Pris-
'bie, 19 Cal.2d 634, 642 [122 P.2d 526]; 23 CalJur. 749, § 124.) 
Under such circumstances it is but reasonable to conclude 
that had the Legislature intended to restrict the dividend 
deduction solely to taxable net income, rather than to cor-
relate it simply with ineome attributable to California sources, 
language expressive of such material change of purpose would 
have been adopted. 
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Additional proof of the legislative intention is found in 
section 9(d) which was also enacted in 1937 (Stats. 1937, 
pp. 2329-2330) when the phrase "included in the measure 
of the tax" first appeared in section 8(h). Thus, in comput-
ing net income, section 9(d) allowed no deduction for "any 
amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable 
to one or more classes of income not included in the measure 
of the tax imposed by this act!' In 80 referring to income 
which is excluded from the computation of the franchise tax, 
the Legislature must have intended it in the sense of "gross 
income," since deductions are not allocable to "net income," 
which ean only result after the appropriate deductions have 
been taken. Speaking to this point, the court in the Green 
Investment Company ease, supra, said at page 233: "In view 
of the use of the word income in section 9 subdivision (d) in 
the sense of gross income we are convinced that it has the 
same significance in section 8 subdivision (h). The Legis-
lature could not have intended to use a significant word in 
two different senses in the same statute (Ra.nsome-Crummey 
Company v. Woodhams, 29 Cal.App. 356 [156 P. 62]; Cole-
man v. Oakland, 110 Cal.App. 715 [295 P. 59].)" 
[aJ Nor does a contrary purpose appear from the 1939 
amendment of section 8(h) by the addition of language allow-
ing the deduction where the dividends were declared "from 
income which has been taxed under the provisions of the 
Corporation Income Tax Act of 1937 to the corporation de-
claring the dividends." The Corporation Income Tax Act 
(Stats. 1937, p. 2184, as amended; Deering'S Gen. Laws, 1937, 
Act 84948,) supplements the Franchise Tax Act and is com-
plementary thereto. (West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 
Ca1.2d 705, 708 [166 P.2d 861].) Manifestly, the purpose of 
the 1939 amendment in the application of the dividend de-
duction was to place corporate stockholders of corporations 
taxable under the Corporation Income Tax Act on an equal 
basis with corporate stockholders of corporations taxable under 
the Franchise Tax Act. Accordingly, the phrase "income 
which has been included in the measure of the tax" for fran-
chise tax purposes and "income which has been taxed under 
the provisions of the Corporation Income Tax Act" should 
be given consistent interpretation. Defendant argUes that 
this is not possible unless the phrase in each ease refers to I 
"net income." The subject of the tax under the Corpora-
tion Income Tax Act is net income; under the Franchise Tax 
,I 
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Act, as previously noted, the subject of the tax is the privi-
lege of exercising corporate franchises within this 8t11.te, 
'and the final measure thereof is "net income." The rate of 
tax is the same in both cases, 4 per cent of net income. 
But notwithstanding this distinction in the nature of the 
tax, once the taxpayer reports his gross income from Cali-
fornia sources, whether for purposes of computation under 
the Franchise Tax Act or the Corporation Income Tax 
Act, all of that income "has passed through the tax mill" 
-has, so to speak, been taxed. Under such circumstances 
the 1939 amendment does not deflect from the propriety 
of construing the word "income" as used in the correlated 
references to mean "gross income." 
Moreover, in considering these successive amendments the 
force of the decision in the Green Investment Company ease 
cannot be overlooked. The court there said: "Since the gross 
income and specified deductions are the factors included in 
arriving at the net income, the conclusion is unavoidable that 
it is gross income that is included in the measure of the tax." 
(60 Ca1.App.2d 233.) That ease was decided in August, 1943. 
Since that time the Legislature has met on three occasions: 
at special sessions in 1944 and' 1946, and at its regular bien-
nial session in 1945, yet it has not amended section 8(h) of 
the act to avoid the result of that decision. Notable at the 
1945 session is its readoption of section 8(h) without the 
slightest change in the language construed in the Green In-
vestment Company ease. (Stats. 1945, p. 1791.) Such re-
adoption of a statutory provision amounts to ratification of 
the court's construction thereof. Speaking to this point, the 
court said in Union Oil Associates v. Johnson, 2 Ca1.2d 727, 
at pages 734-735 [43 P.2d 291, 98 A.L.R. 1499]: "It is a 
cardinal principle of statutory construction that where legis-
lation is framed in the language of an earlier enactment on 
the same or an analogous subject, which has been judicially 
construed, there is a very strong presumption of intent to 
adopt the construction as well as the language of the prior 
enactment." (See, also, Guardianship of Reynolds, 60 Cal. 
App.2d 669, 675 [141 P.2d 498]; Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 
144, 153 [44 S.Ot. 462, 68 L.Ed. 949]; Carroll Electric Co. 
v. Snelling, 62 F.2d 413, 416.) 
But of even greater significance in this connection is the 
Legislature's direct refusal at the 1945 session to adopt an 
amendment to section 8(h) designed to overcome the effect 
. , 
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of the decision in the Green Investment Company ease. A&-
sembly Bill No. 912, introduced at that session for the pur-
pose of amending various sections of the act in question, re-
ferred, among others, to section 8(h). After restating in sub-
division (1) of that subsection the language of section 8(h) 
as amended in 1939, "'pra. said Assembly Bill 912 signifi-
cantly proposed the following addition: "(2) The portion of 
the dividend deductible under subdivision (1) of Section 
8(h) shall be determined by ascertaining the ratio which the 
net income of the corporation declaring the dividend bears 
to the earnings and profits of such corporation for the same 
income year." Assembly Bill No. 913, introduced at the same 
session for the purpose of amending various sections of the 
Oorporation Income Tax Act, contained the same proposal 
with reference to section 7 (h) of that act. so that the correla-
tion in operation between that Act and the Franchise Tax Act 
would continue. It is obvious that the proposed addition in 
the pertinent sections of the two aets provided for the divi-
dend deduction to be determined exactly in the manner in 
which defendant seeks to have it computed here in the absence 
of such provision. However. the Senate, upon recommenda-
tion of its Oommittee on Revenue and Taxation, amended 
both Assembly bills and the proposed addition was stricken 
in each ease. (Senate Journal, Fifty-sixth Session, p. 2635.) 
In such form both bills were ultimately passed: Assembly 
Bill No. 912 became chapter 946 of the 1945 laws (Stats. 1945, 
p. 1779) and Assembly Bill No. 913 became chapter 859 of 
the 1945 laws (Stats. 1945, p. 1572). Such action of the Leg-
islature forcefully demonstrates that it appreciated that a 
substantial change in the wording of section 8 (h) would be 
required to effect a different basis for allowance of the divi-
dend deduction as previously provided and construed; and 
that it decided to adhere to the premise of the Green Invest-
ment Oompany ease in the construction of said section. 
For these reasons we conclude that plaintiff was entitled to 
deduct the Ventura dividend in full on its respective fran-
chise tax returns covering its 1937 and 1938 income. 
The judgments are, and each of them is, aftlrmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
The allowance of the deduction in section 8(h) of the Bank 
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vent double taxation of corporate income by this state. This 
section was drafted to cover dividends generally; it was not 
aimed particularly at dividends declared out of earnings or 
profits not included in the measure of the tax because of the 
percentage depletion deduction. Dividends out of earnings 
or profits not included in the measure of the tax on the 
dividend-declaring corporation because of the percentage de-
pletion deduction are on the same footing as any other divi-
dends out of earnings or profits not included in the measure 
of the tax on such corporation. Earnings or profits may be 
excluded from the measure of the tax for a variety of reasons 
other than the percentage depletion deduction. They may 
represent income earned by the dividend-declaring eorpora-
tion from business outside of this state; they may have been 
accumulated before the effective date of the act; they may have 
been declared by a corporation not taxable under the Bank 
and Corporation Franchise Tax Act. Whatever the reason 
earnings or profits of the dividend-declaring corporation are 
not included in the measure of the tax on such corporation, a 
recipient corporation cannot deduct dividends declared out 
of such earnings or profits, for the deduction is expressly 
limited to dividends declared out of income that was in-
cluded in the measure of the tax. 
If all of the net income of a corporation is derived from 
business in California, and all of its earnings or profits are in-
cluded in the measure of the tax, all dividends declared out of 
such earnings or profits will be deductible by the recipient 
corporations. The same income would be taxed twice if it 
were included in the measure of the tax on the dividend-
declaring corporation and included again in the measure of the 
tax on the recipient corporations. If none of the income of the 
dividend-declaring corporation is included in the measure of 
the tax on such corporation, none of its dividends will be 
deductible by the recipient corporations. Thus the dividend-
declaring corporation may be a foreign corporation that does 
no business in California and is not subject to the act; it may 
be a Federal Reserve Bank not subject to state taxation; it 
may be an insurance company not subject to taxation on or 
measured by net income; it may have earned the income in 
question before the effective date of the Bank and Corpora-
tion Franchise Tax Act. 
The income of the dividend-dee1aring corporation may be 
derived in part from business carried em outside the state . 
) 
· < 
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Income from out of state business is not included in the meas-
ure of the tax and consequently dividends representing such 
income are not deductible by the recipient corporations. 
The deduction is allowed only when the earnings or profits 
out of which the dividends are declared have been included 
in the measure of the tax on the corporation declaring the 
dividends. For example: X Corporation, which derives all 
its income from business done in this state, declares a dividend 
from its earnings or profits to Y, a foreign corporation not 
subject to the act, which in turn, out of the money received 
declares a dividend to Z, which is taxable under the act. Since 
the earnings 01' profits from which the dividend was declared 
by Y was not included in the measure of a tax under the 
Act on Y, the dividend is not deductible by Z. Even if Y 
did business in California, and was therefore taxable under 
the act, Z could not deduct the dividend, since the earnings 
or profits from which the dividend was declared would not 
be included in the measure of the tax on Y because the divi-
dend would be deductible by Y under section 8(h). 
A dividend may be declared by a foreign corporation that 
operates an oil well outside this state and does no business 
here. It may have no net income for purposes of taxation, 
:md ~-et have earnings or profits for dividend purposes. A 
('J.lltornia corporation receiving such a dividend could not 
(~cJuet the amount thereof under section 8(h), for the earn-
~.'.;s 01' profits out of which it was declared were not included 
;,1 U~e mcasure of the tax by this state on the dividend-dee1ar-
:1lJ' corporation. The result would be no different if the 
l~iv;d;;!ll1-decl:ll'ing corporation were a California corporation 
operating its oil well in this state. Since it would have no 
11et in~ome under the act, it would pay the minimum tax 
of $25. Yet it would have earnings or profits from which 
to declare dividends to its shareholders. Such dividends 
would 110t be deductible for the reason that prevails in all 
C:::tses in which dividends are not deductible, namely, the 
eamings or profits out of which the dividends are declared 
would not be included in the measure of the tax on the 
uividcnd-declaring corporation. 
In the foregoing example, the dividend-declaring corpora-
tion had no net income. The principle that the deduction is 
allowed only to the extent necessary to prevcnt double tax-
ation by this state is equally applicable when the dividend·· 
) 
) 
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declaring corporation has net income. Thus a California on 
company after deducting percentage depletion, may have net 
income for tax purposes of $500,000 but earnings or profits 
of $1,000,000 for dividend distributions. If the earnings or 
profits are distributed as a dividend to a California corpora~ 
tion, only one-half of the dividend will be deductible, since 
the measure of the tax on the dividend-declaring corporation 
will include only one·half of the earnings or profits out of 
which the dh"idend is declared. 
In the present cases, the earnings or profits from which 
the dividends were declared likewise exceeded the net income 
by which the tax on the dividend~eclaring corporation was 
measured, and there has obviously been no tax measured by 
such excess. To the extent they represent such excess, 
dividends cannot be deducted without defeating the pur· 
pose of section 8 (h) to limit the deduction to the extent 
necessary to prevent double taxation. 
Not only the purpose of section 8(h) but its express pro-
visions preclude a deduction in their entirety of the dividends 
in question. Section 8(h) as amended in 1937 provides: 
"Section 8: In computing 'net income' the following de-
duction shall be allowed: .•• (h) Dividends received dur~ 
ing the income year from a bank or corporation doing busi~ 
ness in this State declared from income which has been 
included in the measure of the tax imposed by this Act 
upon the bank or corporation declaring the dividend." In 
1939 the Legislature added the following to section 8(h): 
"or from income which has been taxed under the provi. 
sions of the Corporation Income Tax Act of 19371 to the 
corporation declaring the dividends." 
The purpose of this provision can be grasped only if its 
terms are understood. The "measure of the tax imposed by 
this Act" is net income. (§§ I, 2, 4.) "Net income" is de-
fined in section 7 of the act to mean "gross income" as de~ 
fined in section 6, less the deductions provided for in section 8. 
"Dh"idends" mean "any distribution made by a corporation 
/ to its shareholders . . . out of its earnings or profits. . . .. .. 
lThe Corporation Income Tax Act supplements the Bank and Corpora-
tion Franchise Tax Act and imposes a tax on the net income of certain 
corporations not subject to the latter act. (Bee West Publishing Co. v. 
McColgan, 27 Cal.2d 705, 708 [166 P.2d 861].) 
lIThis aefinition was added in 1939. The Franchise Tax Commissioner, 
following the federal income tax law on which the state act is bn~ed, 
ascribed the same meaning tc> the term "dvidend" in the administration 
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(§ 6(e) (1).) "Earnings or profits," generally speaking, 
mean gross receipts less the expense of producing them. 
(Weyerhaeuser, 33 B.T.A. 594, 597; Ayer, 12 B.T.A. 284, 
287.) Since dividends are declared, not from statutory 
gross income or statutory net income, but from earnings or 
profits, and only from earnings or profits, the word "in-
come" in the phrase "Dividends . • .' declared from income 
• • ." necessarily means earnings or profits. 
Since net income (statutory gross income less statutory de-
ductions) and earnings or profits (gross receipts less the ex-
pense of producing them) are computed difEerently, they will 
usually not be the same. If the earnings or profits exceed net 
income, it follows 88 a mathematical certainty that part of 
the earnings or profits have not been included in the measure 
of the tax and that the dividends declared out of such earn-
ings or profits are not fully deductible. 
The following illustrations, cited by defendant, show the 
difference between net income and earnings or profits and 
demonstrate that dividends may be declared from earnings 
or profits that have not been included in the measure of the 
taL A domestic corporation, engaged in activities solely 
within this state, receives gross income of $100,000 and pays 
salaries amounting to $40,000, rent amounting to $25,000 and 
federal income taxes amounting to $15,000. For purposes 
of computing earnings or profits all of these items are taken 
into consideration, but for purposes of computing net income, 
federal income taxes are not, since they are not deductible 
under the act. Thus we have the following comparison: 
11a1"3i1l.g' or Profit. Net 111.COme 
Gross Gross 
Income $100,000 Income $100,000 
Minus Minus 
Salaries $40,000 Salaries $40,000 
Rent 25,000 Bent 25,000 65,000 i 
Federal 
Income 
Taxes 15,000 80,000 ----
Earnings 
or profits $20,000 $35,000 
In the foregoing illustration, the statutory net income is 
greater than the earnings or profits because federal income 
taxes are not deductible in eomputins net iDeome. Since the 
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net income includes all the earnings and profits (it even 
exceeds them), any dividends declared out of such earnings 
or profits will represent income included in the measure of 
the tax, and will thercJfore be fully deductible. The reverse 
may be true. Suppose the same facts as above except that 
the corporation engages in activities both within and with-
out the state and that under an appropriate allocation for-
mula only 30 per cent of its net income is attributable to 
this state. The comparison would then be: 
Earnings or profits $20,000 Total Net Income $35,000 
Net income attribu-
table to California 80% 
$10,500 
In the foregoing nlusb'ation the earnings or profits are 
greater than the net income by which the tax is measured 
because net income not attributable to California is ex-
cluded from the measure of the tax. Dividends declared 
out of earnings or profits representing such income will 
therefore not be deductible. 
Similarly, dividends declared out of earnings or profits 
excluded from the measure of the tax by virtue of the deduc-
tion for percentage depletion are not deductible. It makes 
no difference whether percentage depletion is allowed as an 
exemption, an exclusion from gross income, or as a deduction 
from gross income. Income representing the allowance for 
depletion is as efi'ectively excluded from the measure of the 
tax by way of deduction as it would be by way of an exemp-
tion or exclusion from gross income. The figure that is left 
after the deductions are taken is net income. That part of 
the gross income accounted for by deductions cannot pos-
sibly be included in net income, for the deductions exclude 
the amount thereof from the net income. Most of the deduc-
tions will represent outlays made in earning the gross income, 
and since such outlays cannot be the source of dividends, no 
problem with respect thereto can arise under section 8(h). 
The problem presented in the instant cases can arise only 
when the item deducted is itself income that is part of the 
corporation's earnings and profits. When the deduction for 
depletion represents a return of the corporation's capital, any 
dividend distribution represented by the amount of such de-
duction would be a return of capital to the shareholders and 
. , 
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would lower the basis of the stock for computing gain or loss. 
If the depletion allowance does not rcpresent a return of 
capiro) it can only represent earnings and profits (See Rudick, 
"Dividcncl.9" and "Earnings or P"o/ifs" Under the lncorne 
Tax Law, 89 U. of PaL.Rev., 865, 866; 1 Mertens' Law of Fed-
eral Income Taxation, 472; Ayer, 12 B.T.A. 284; Treas. Reg. 
111, § 29.1115-3.) that are not included in the measure of the 
tax. Since such earnings and profits are not included in the 
corporation's net income and therefore not included in the 
measure of the tax, dividends declared therefrom do not meet • 
the requirements of section 8(h) as dividends "declared from 
income which has been included in the measure of the tax." 
Suppose a domestic eorporation is engaged in activities 
solely within this state. Suppose further that it receives gross 
income in the amount of $130,000, including royalties from 
oil and gas wells in the amount of $100,000, and that the 
eorporation pays salaries of $40,000, and that it does not 
have any eost depletion but takes a deduction for depletion 
equal to 27% per cent of the $100,000, or $27,500. The 
eomparative eomputations would then be: 
Earnings or Profits Net Income 
Gross Gross 
Income $130,000 Income $1.30,000 
Minus Minus 
Salaries $40,000 Salaries $40,000 
n~nt 25,000 Rent 25,000 
Federal Percentage 
Income Depletion 27,000 92,500 
Taxes 15,000 80,000 
Earnings 
or profits $50,000 Net Income $37,500 
In this illustration nothing is subtracted for depletion in 
computing earnings or profits because there was no depletion 
cost, and nothing is subtracted for federal income taxes in 
computing net income because the act does not provide for a 
I deduction for federal income taxes. On the other hand, fed-
I eral income taxes are subtracted in computing earnings or 
profits because they are an expense, and percentage depletion 
is deducted in computing net income because the act provides 
for such a deduction. In this illustration the earnings or i 
profits exceed the net income by $12,500, and it is mathemati-
cal1¥ impossible for aueb excess to be included in the DDt iD-. 
. 1 
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come. Consequently, dividends cannot be deducted to the 
extent they are declared out of such excess. 
In the present cases, the "net income" of the Ventura 
Land and Water Company (hereinafter called "Ventura") 
for tax purposes for the year 1937 was $775,282.65. It was 
stipulated that the earnings or profits of Ventura for that 
year were $963,338.63. The two figures differ for the fol-
lowing reasons: The "earnings or profits" were not reduced 
on account of cost of depletion because there was none, but 
in computing "net income," $328,836.47 was deductible as 
percentage depletion, because this deduction was provided 
for by statute. On the other hand, Ventura had outlays of 
$110,372.58 for federal income taxes, $30.157.90 for California 
franchise tax and $250 as nondeductible contributions, all of 
which served to reduce Ventura's "earnings or profits," be-
cause they constituted expenses, but none of which was de-
ductible in computing "net income" for franchise tax pur-
poses, because the act does not provide for such deductions. 
Thus, although Ventura's "net income" for franchise tax pur-
poses for the income year 1937 was $775.282.65, its "earnings 
or profits" (the fund available for distribution of dividends) 
for that year amounted to $963.338.63. or $188,055.98 more 
than its net income. The excess for 1938 was $203,976.28. 
& in the preceding example, it is mathematically impossible 
for the earnings or profits in excess of the net income to be 
included in the net income. Consequently, at least to the 
extent the dividends represent such excess, they are not 
deductible. 
Plaintiff contends, and the majority opinion sustains the 
contention, that the phrase "income which has been included 
in the measure of the tax" refers to "gross income subject to 
taxation by the state" and since that item would include earn-
ings and profits attributable to California sources, dividends 
paid therefrom would be "declared from income which has 
been included in the measure of the tax. t, 
The Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act imposes a tax 
"according to or measured by net income." (§§ 1,2,4.) How 
could the Legislature state in plainer terms that "net income" 
is the measure of the tax 7 In the light of this language how 
can it be seriously contended that the measure of the tax is 
"gross income subject to taxation' by the state7" Plaintiff 
confuses the measure of t.he tax with its computation. It is 
true that gross income is a necessary factor in computing net 
.. 
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income. So are the deductions allowed, but that does not make 
them the measure of the tax. Any gross income that remains 
after deductions are taken is included in the measure of the 
tax, but it is logically and mathematieal1y impossible for any 
fgrosB income that is represented by such deductions to be 
included therein. In concrete figures, plaintiff's contention 
amounts to saying that if a corporation has gross income of 
$100,000 and is allowed deductions of $50,000, leaving a net 
. income of $50,000, then the whole $100,000 has been included 
in the net of $50,000. 
Any possible doubt that section 8(h) requires the source of 
the dividend to be included in the net income of the dividend 
declaring corporation has been dispelled by the 1939 amend-
ment adding the phrase "or from income which has been taxed 
under the provisions of the Corporation Income Tax Aet of 
1937 to the corporation declaring the dividends." The pur-
pose of this amendment is to place corporate shareholders of 
corporations taxable under the Corporation Income Tax Act 
i>n an equal footing with corporate shareholders of corpora-
tions taxable under the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax 
Act. The two acts are complementary. (See West Publishing I 
Co. v. McColgan, 27 Ca1.2d 705, 708 [166 P.2d 861].) The rate 
of tax is the same and the provisions for the two acts are 
correlated. The essential difference between them is that in 
the former the subjeet of the tax is net income, in the latter 
the subject of the tax is the privilege of doing business in this 
state in corporate form, and net income is the measure of the 
tax. Since the Corporation Income Tax Act is imposed di-
rectly on net income, the 1939 amendment does not use the 
phrase "income included in the measure of the tax." Had the 
Legislature intended the phrase as used with respect to 
corporations subject to the Bank and Corporation Franchise 
Tax Act to mean gross income it would have provided in the 
1939 amendment for the deduction of dividends declared from 
gross income rather than from income taxed under the Cor-
poration Income r,rax Act. 
Assume for the purposes of argument that "income" as 
used in section 8(h) means "gross income" as plaintiff con-
tends. Section 8(h) would then be construed as if it read, 
"Dividends received during the income year declared from 
gross income which has been included in the measure of the 
tax." Even this construction would not support plaintiff's 
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phrase, "which has been included in the measure of the to" 
a phrase that recognizes unequivocally that not all "gross in-
come" is included in the measure of the to. 
Only if all gross income is included in the measure of the 
tax ean plaintUf's contention be sustained. In the foregoing 
discussion it has been demonstrated that when the earnings or 
profits out of which dividends have been declared exceed the 
statutory net income of the dividend-deelaring corporation, it 
is mathematically impossible for all of the iross income to be 
included in the measure of the tax on such corporation. Con-
fusing net income with the process of computing it, plaintUf 
contends that all gross income is included in the measure of 
the to because it is "income which has been taken into ac-
count" or "income which has been through the to mill" or 
"income which has been 1lailed by the tax master." This con-
tention would render meaningless the limitation of the deduc-
tion to "dividends declared from income which has been in-
cluded in the measure of the tax," for the gross income of all 
corporations taxable under the act is "taken into aeeount" or 
goes "through the to mill" or is "1lailed by the tax master." 
Accordingly, dividends declared by such corporations would 
be deductible in their entirety. Thus the entire gross income 
of a corporation doing business within and without this state 
is "taken into account" in computing its tax. The corporation 
is required to report its gross income from all sources, both 
within and without the state, and the net income that is ar-
rived at after taking the statutory deductions is allocated part 
to this state and the remainder to the other states, usually by 
means of a formula. (Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d 
664 [111 P.2d 334]; 315 U.S. 501 [62 S.Ot. 701, 86 L.Ed. 
991].) Thus, for purposes of illustration, suppose a corpora-
tion that does business in California and in other states has a 
total gross income from all its business for a particular year of 
$1,000,000, earnings or profits of $800,000, and net income of 
$600,000, of which $60,000 is attributable to California. If the 
corporation then pays out the entire $800,000 of earnings or 
profits as dividends to California corporations whose only 
activities were in this state, the view that all amounts that 
have been taken into account as "gross income" have thereby 
been included in the measure of the tax would mean that the 
California corporations receiving these dividends amounting 
to $800,000 could deduct them in their entirety although the 
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measured by $600,000. Certainly no such result is necessary 
to avoid double taxation by this state, andplainti1f con-
cedes that such dividends would not be fully deductible. Yet 
such dividends meet the conditions urged by plaintiff for 
the deduction of the dividends in question, for all the gross 
income of the dividend-declaring corporation was "taken into 
account," "went through the tax mill" and was "flailed by 
the tax master." 
Plaintiff's suggestion that the disputed phrase in section 
8(h) should be interpreted to mean "gross income attributable 
to California sources" is not only administratively unwork-
able but is inconsistent with the basic structure of the act. 
With respect to a corporation doing business within and 
without the state, the act provides, not for the ascertainment of 
the gross income attributable to this state, but for the ascer-
tainment of the net income attributable to this state. Such 
a corporation is required to report its gross income from all 
sources within and without the state; all applicable deductions 
are taken, and the total net income is determined. Part of this 
total is then allocated to this state. Ordinarily, in the cases of 
businesses conducted within and without the state there is no 
feasible way of determining what part of the gross income or 
of the deductions is attributable to this state. Consequently, 
the act provides for a determination of the amount of net 
income earned by the business as a whole and then for an 
allocation of part of that income to this state. 
It is contended that it is anomalous for the Legislature to 
allow oil companies a deduction for depletion that is more than 
sofIicient for a recovery of costs and then in effect to nullify 
the tax savings derived by the dividend-declaring corporation 
from percentage depletion by denying their corporate share-
holders a deduction for dividends out of earnings or profits 
represented by the depletion deduction. The extent to which 
income is taxed and the extent to which deductions are anowed 
is entirely a matter of legislative discretion so long as con-
stitutional restrictions are observed. The Legislature has seen 
fit to allow a deduction for depletion in the terms prescribed. 
It has also seen fit to deny a deduction for dividends unless 
double taxation by this state would result. Whether it was 
wise for the Legislature to do either of these things is of no 
concern here. The Legislature has not cbosen, as it could have, 
to require domestic corporations to include their entire net 
income, including income from out-of-state business, in the 
. , 
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measure of the tax. Yet it denies corporate shareholders of 
such corporations a deduction for dividends declared out of 
earnings or profits from out-of-state business, and the very 
reason it does so is that such earnings or profits are not in-
cluded in the measure of the tax on the dividend-declaring 
corporation. There is no more reason to grant corporate share-
holders of oil companies a deduction for dividends out of 
earnings or profits excluded from the measure of the tax on 
such companies by way of the deduction for percentage deple-
tion than there would be to grant corporate shareholders of 
domestic corporations a deduction for dividends declared 
from earnings or profits excluded from the measure of the tax 
on such corporations because derived from out-of-state busi-
ness. In each case the recipient corporations are denied the 
deduction because the tax savings allowed the dividend-
declaring corporation preclude double taxation by this state. 
Section 3 of the Corporation Income Tax Act provides: 
"provided, however, that the income of any corporation which 
is included in the measure of the tax imposed by the Bank and 
Corporation Franchise Tax Act, Statutes 1929, Chapter 13, 
as amended, shall not be subject to the tax imposed by this 
act. • . ." Plaintiff contends that if the Bank and Corpora-
tion Franchise Tax Act applies, the Corporation Income Tax 
Act does not apply and that since this is the clear meaning of 
section 3 it follows that the phrase "included in the measure 
of the tax" in section 3 of the Corporation Income Tax Act 
must mean gross income from California sources. The pur-
pose of the Corporation Income Tax Act is to prevent dis-
crimination against corporations subject to the Bank and 
Corporation Franchise Tax Act. Since the subject of the tax 
in the latter act is the privilege of exercising corporate fran-
chises in this state, decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court prevent its application to foreign corporations engaged 
exclusively in interstate commerce. (See cases cited in West 
Publishing 00. v. McOolgan, 27 Ca1.2d 705, 708 [166 P.2d 
861].) A tax on the net income of such corporations, however, 
is valid, and the Corporation Income Tax Act imposes such a 
tax. (Ibid. p. 709, West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 328 
U.S. 823 [66 s.Ot. 1378, 90 L.Ed. 1603].) In order to avoid 
any suggestion of discrimination against interstate commerce 
the act was made applicable to the income of all corporations 
derived from sources within this state, including the income 
of corporations taxable under the Bank and Corporation 
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Franchise Tax Act. In order to prevent discrimination against 
corporations taxable under the latter act by the imposition of 
a double tax burden thereon, section 3 of the Corporation 
Income Tax Act was added to exempt the income included in 
the measure of the tax on such corporations. If that were the 
only exemption provision in the Corporation Income Tax Act, 
other income, such as income from out-of-state business, from 
dividends for which a deduction is allowed, and income repre-
sented by the depletion deduction would be taxable under the 
Corporation Income Tax Act. That act, however, contains 
other provisions identical with provisions of the Bank and 
Corporation Franchise Tax Act that allow a deduction for 
dividends (§ 7 (h» and percentage depletion (§ 7 (g» and that 
exclude income from out-of-state business. (§ 3, 13.) Thus the 
exemption of such income in the Corporation Income Tax Act 
arises because of specific provisions of that act and not from 
any theory that gross income is included in the measure of the 
Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax within the meaning of 
section 3 of the Corporation Income Tax Act. 
A comprehensive tax statute such as the Bank and Corpora-
tion Franchise Tax Act exemplifies intricate draftmanship; 
it evolves out of the painstaking deliberations and studies not 
only of public officials but of others interested in tax legisla-
tion. Such a statute, wrought from a consideration of many 
con1licting interests, cannot long retain unity and coherence if 
one section or another is refabricated by the courts without 
regard for the structural whole. The technical concepts of the 
statute, its express provisions, should not lightly be vitiated 
by facile phrases such as "gone through the tax mill" or 
"flailed by the taxmaster" that denote a lack of insight into 
the legislative purpose that binds together the provisions 
of the statute. If the express words of the statute are over-
ridden by such phrases neither taxpayers nor tax officials 
can look to the written word of the statute for its authentiQ 
meaning, and the already difficult task of understanding the 
revenue acts becomes hopeless. 
, 
The majority opinion relies heavily on the case of Burton 
E. Green Investment Co. v. McColU(J"'. (60 Cal.App.2d 224 
[140 P.2d 451], petition for hearing denied by this court.) 
That case unquestionably supports plaintiff's contentions, but 
in my opinion it was erroneously decided and should be dis-
approved. It is contended, however, that section 8(h) was not 
amended at the regular session or the two special sessions of 
I 
/ 
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the Legislature after the decision in that ease, that in 1945 a 
Senate committee rejected a proposed amendment providing 
that dividends were deductible only in the ratio of the divi-
dend-declaring corporation's earnings or profits to its net 
income, and that therefore the Legislature adopted the court's 
construction of the act in the Green ease. The opinion in the 
Green case, however, contains 80 many errors fundamentally 
at variance with many provisions of the act that the Legisla-
ture cannot reasonably be presumed to have adopted the con-
struction of the act in that case. These errors will bebriefiy 
described. 
(1) The court in the Green case states (60 Cal.App.2d 224, 
231) that net income "does not constitute the 'measure of the 
tax.' The income included in the measure of the tax is all 
income." These statements repudiate the following express 
provisions of the act: "Every national banking association 
located within the limits of this State shall annually pay to the 
State a tax according fo or measured by it$ ft.ef income, to be 
computed, in the manner hereinafter provided, upon the basis 
of its Mf income for the next preceding :fiscal. or ealendar 
year .•.. " (§ 1; italics added.) "Every bank, other than a 
national banking association, located within the limits of this 
State, shan annually pay to the State, for the privilege of 
exercising its corporate franchises within this State, a tax 
according to or measured by its ft.et income, to be computed, in 
the manner hereinafter provided, upon the basis of its ft.ef 
ift.come for the next preceding fiscal or ealendar year. • • !' 
(§ 2; italics added.) "Every financial corporation doing busi-
ness within the limits of this State ••• shall annually pay to 
the State, for the privilege of exercising its corporate fran-
chises within this State, a tax GCCOrdift.g fo or measured by its 
ft.ef income, to be computed, in the manner hereinafter pro-
vided, upon the basis of its ft.ef income . ••• " (§ 4(1) ; italics 
added.} "With the exception of financial corporations, every 
corporation doing business within the limits of this State ..• 
shan annually pay to the State, for the privilege of exercising 
its corporate franchises within this State, a tax occordift.g fo 
or measured by its ft.ef ift.COme, to be computed in the manner 
hereinafter provided, • • • upon the basis of its ft.et income 
for the next preceding fiscal or calendar year •••• " (§ 4(3) ; 
italics added.) If the income included in the measure of the 
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the tax on national banks would be invalid under section 5219 
of the United States Revised Statutes, for, while that section 
authorizes a tax on national banks according to or measured 
by their net income, it does not authorize a tax measured by all 
their income. Can it reasonably be contended that the Legis-
lature adopted a construction that would not only repudiate 
express provisions of the act but invalidate the tax on na-
tional banks! 
(2) The court in the Green case states (60 Ca1.App.2d 224, 
233), that proof of the legislative intention is to be found in 
section 9(d), which was also enacted in 1937. That section 
provides: "In computing net income no deduction shall be 
allowed for: ••• (d) Any amount otherwise allowable as a 
deduction which is allocable to one or more classes of income 
not included in the measure of the tax imposed by this act." 
The court states that the word "income" is used in section 
9(d) in the sense of "gross income" and that the word "in-
come" in section 8(h) must have been used in the same sense. 
Why must it! The two sections serve difl'erent purposes and 
there is no necessary relation between them. Assume, however, 
for the purpose of argument, that the word "income" means 
"gross income" in both sections. The court also states (60 
Cal.App.2d 224, 231) that all income is included in the 
measure of the tax. Yet section 9 (d) specifically refers to 
"classes of income which have not been included in the measure 
of the tax. •.• " U all income is included in the measure of 
the tax, as the court says it is, how can there be classes of 
income that have not been included in the measure of the tad 
The court's reasoning renders section 9(d) meaningless, for, 
if, as the court says, all income is included in the measure of 
the tax, there would never be a case in which items of income 
had not been included in the measure of the tax, and hence, 
there never would be a case in which any amount was allocable 
to one or more classes of income not included in the measure 
of the tax. 
In section Sed) the Legislature was not concerned with the 
question whether the classes of income referred to were either 
"gross income" or "net income." There are several reasons 
why a class of income may not have been included in the 
measure of the tax: it may be a class of income that has been 
excluded from the statutory definition of gross income, e. g. 
amounts received under life insurance policies (§ 6(b» ; it 
may be a class of income, which., although required to be re-
. , 
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ported in gross income is fully deductible, such 88 income from 
business activities of certain types of corporations (§§ 8(1) 
and S(m» ; or it may be a class of income that is allocated to 
other states because it is derived from sources outside this 
state, e. g. income from intangibles having a situs outside the 
state. (§ 10.) 
(3) The court in the Green case states (60 Ca1.App.2d 224, 
235) that "the Act makes no provision for computing deple-
tion on the basis of cost." This statement is ettoneous. Section 
8(g) of the act as amended in 1937 incorporated by reference 
the provisions of section 113 and 114 of the federal Revenue 
Act of 1936. Since 1939 these provisions have been set forth 
in full in the California Act. Under these provisions, a deduc-
tion may be taken for either cost depletion or percentage de-
pletion, whichever is greater. Hence, if cost depletion exceeds 
percentage depletion a deduction for cost depletion may be 
taken. Certainly, the Legislature did not adopt a construction 
of the act that repudiates 80 vital a provision. 
(4) The court in the Green case erroneously assumed that 
percentage depletion represents an exhaustion of capital and 
that the dividends were fully deductible to prevent a tax on 
capital. The court states (60 Cal.App.2d 224, 234) that 
"Whatever method of computing depletion be followed • • • 
the purpose is to leave in the hands of the taxpayer unappro-
priated that portion of the cost attributable to the amount of 
capital exhausted in earning the income on which any variety 
of tax is to be paid. • • . In view of the extreme difficulty of 
devising a precise formula . . . it was obviously determined 
that depletion based on a percentage of the gross income from 
the mineral or oil deposit must closely approximate the actual 
physical exhaustion .••. If it represents a positive exhaustion 
of capital it should be deducted by the owner of the property 
88 a method of avoiding the exhaustion of capital. If it is 
properly deducted in computing the oil operator's income for 
dividend purposes it should not thereafter be charged to the 
recipient corporation in computing his income for franchise 
tax purposes. To avoid such a hardship the recipient is author-
ized to deduct the dividend .•. !' 
The foregoing statement is in error on at least three counts: 
(a) Percentage depletion does not necessarily represent an 
exhaustion of capital. "Percentage depletion is not based on 
cost and in many eases taxpayers recover tax free by way of 
. . 
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percentage depletion far in excess of the cost of their oil 
properties .••• " (Estate of Japhet, 3 Tax Court 86.) The 
percentage depletion deduction may continue, as here, after 
cost or capital invested has been eompletely recovered. Thus, 
in the present eases Ventura had deductions of $328,836.47 and 
$384,872.10 for percentage depletion in the two years here 
involved. It is stipulated that Ventura fully recovered its cost 
or capital in prior years. Therefore, there can be no question 
of "invasion of capital" since Ventura has completely re-
covered its capital investment in prior years. There also was 
no question of invasion of capital in the Green ease. 
(b) Percentage depletion in excess of cost depletion is not 
deductible in computing earnings or profits for dividend pur-
poses. (Ayer, 12 B.T.A. 284; Wood, 3 T.C. 187; see, Rudick, 
"DWide1Uls" and "Earnings Of' Profits" under The Income 
Tax Law, 89 U.ofPa.L.Rev., 865, 886; 1 Mertens, Law of Fed-
eral Income Taxation 472.) Plaintiff in the present eases recog-
nized this and stipulated to the computations of "earnings or 
profits" for the years involved. These computations plainly 
show that percentage depletion in excess of cost depletion is I 
not a deductible item in computing the fund available for 
dividends. 
(c) If a corporate distribution is a "dividend" within the 
meaning of the act, then necessarily no element of capital can 
be present in the distribution. "Dividends" are specifically 
defined in the act (§ 6 (1» as distributions ont of earnings 
or profits. In computing "earnings or profits" available for 
dividends, a deduction for cost depletion is always allowed as 
long as there is any cost to be recovered. Any distribution out 
of capital would not be a "dividend" because it would not be 
made out of earnings or profits. If a distribution is made out 
of capital it does not constitnte a dividend and the recipient 
cannot claim a deduction for it under section 8(h), which 
permits a deduction only for dividends. A distribution out of 
capital reduces the basis for tax purposes of the stock held by 
recipients of the distribntion, but cannot constitute a dividend. 
Since a dividend is defined as a distribution out of "earnings 
or profits," it follows that any corporate distribution that 
constitutes a dividend cannot represent an invasion of capital. 
The distributions in the Green ease were admitted to be 
dividends. Hence the conclusion of the court that a deduction 
of the Belridge dividends was necessary to prevent a tax on 
capital was clearly in error • 
) 
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(5) The court in the Green case erroneously stated (60 
Cal.App.2d 224, 233), that the 1937 amendment to section 
8 (h) was not intended to alter its meaning as expressed in 
1933. A comparison of the amended sections and a list of the 
changes effected will show the extent of the court's error. 
Section 8(h) as amended in 1933 (Stats. 1933 ch. 209) pro-
vided: "In computing 'net income' the following deductions 
shall be allowed: (h) Dividends received during the taxable 
year from a bank or corporation doing business in this State 
declared from income arising out of business done in this 
state: . • • The provisions of this subsection shall not apply 
to dividends received from corporations not taxable under 
article thirteen of the Constitution of this State. • •• " See-
tion 8 (h) as amended in 1937 provided: "Dividends received 
during the income year from a bank or corporation doing 
business in this State declared from income which has been in-
cluded in the measure of the tax imposed by this act upon the 
bank or corporation declarin/l the dividends." The most 
obvious change made by the 1937 amendment was to restrict 
the deduction to dividends declared by corporations taxable 
under the act, as contrasted with the 1933 section. which per-
mitted the deduction as long as the declarer corporation was 
doing business in the state and was subject to tax under 
article XIII of the Constitution. Thus, for example, dividends 
from insurance companies would be deductible under the 1933 
act, but not under the 1937 act. Another obvious change was 
the restriction of the dividend deduction to distributions from 
income that had been included in the measure of the tax im-
posed upon the corporation declaring the dividends. The in-
sertion of this restriction was prompted by the decision in 
Corpora.tion of America v. Johnson, 7 Cal.2d 295 (60 P.2d 
417], which interpreted the language "income arising out of 
business done in this State," which appeared in the 1929 ver-
sion of section 8 (h) as not restricted to income from business 
done by the corporation declaring the dividends. Since the 
same phrase "income arising out of business done in this 
State" was present in the 1933 provisions of section 8(h) pre-
sumably the rule of the Corporation of America case applied to 
it except as restricted by other conditions in the 1933 act. 
The plaintiff seeks to dismiss these errors as "rhetorical 






'106 RosElUBY PROPERTIES, INC. 11. MCCoLGAN [29 C.2d 
were the very premises on which the court based its interpre-
tation of the statute. This court's denial of a hearing in the 
Green ease does not constitute approval of the propositions of 
law laid down in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal. 
(Western Lithograph Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 11 
Ca1.2d 156, 167-168 [78 P.2d 731; 117 A.L.R. 838] ; Bohn v. 
Bohn, 164 Cal. 532, 537-538 {129 P. 981).)1 In Helvering v. 
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 [60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 
A.L.R. 1368], the United States Supreme Court said that "It 
would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping con-
gressional silence to debar this court from re-examining it. 
own doctrines." In the present ease not even the re-examina-
tion of this court's own doctrines is involved. 
Rules of statutory construction are at best only aids in 
ascertaining the legislative purpose. One of those aids has 
here been seized upon, in disregard of the plain signposts 
within the statute and the basic concepts underlying it, to 
establish administratively unworkable conditions, accord un-
equal treatment to dividends, and open the way to a more ex-
tensive deduction than necessary to achieve the legislative 
purpose of avoiding double taxation. 
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 [66 S.Ct. 826, 
90 L.Ed. 1084] directly involved the question whether fail-
ure to amend a statute after a judicial construction thereof 
constituted congressional adoption of that construction. The 
court said: "We conclude that the Schwimmer, Macintosh 
and Bland Cases do not state the correct rule of law. We 
lIn BOM v. Boh., .tUprG, the court decla.red: "Our further examina· 
tion of the ease has led us to the conclusion that the Department opinion 
was correct. The principal reason for granting a heanng in Bank was 
that, in a ease between the lIllXle parties, presenting precisely the same 
issues of fact and law, the distriet court of appeal for the second appellate 
distriet had reversed an order like the one here appealed from, and that 
a petition to have the appeal transferred to this court for hearing and 
determination had been denied. (Boh. v. Boh., 16 Cal.App. 179 [116 P. 
568J.) It is, of course, much to be regretted that opposite rulings should 
be made in two eases which present identieal questions. But an order of 
this court, refusing to transfer a cause after judgment in the distriet court 
of appeal, does not adopt the opinion of the appellate court 10 as to give 
it, in this court, the authoritative e11'ect which one of our own decisions 
would have. Being now convinced that the order appealed from should 
be aflirmed, we must 150 declare, even though this view necessarily involves 
the conclusion that the earlier appeal should have been transferred to this 
court, and thereupon disposed of by a judgment dilfering from that ren-
dered in the district court of appeal. Indeed, believing, u we do, that 
the order now under review was properly made, it would be our duty to 
affirm it1 even if thiB court had itself, in another case, reversed an ord ... 
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are met, however, with the argument that even though those 
eases were wrongly decided, Oongress has adopted the rule 
which they announced. The argument runs as follows: Many 
dorts were made to amend the law so as to change the rule 
announced by those eases; but in every instance the bill died 
in committee. Moreover, in 1940 when the New Naturaliza-
tion Act was pa.CJScd, Oongress reenacted the oath in its pre-
existing form, though at the same time it made extensive 
changes in the requirements and procedure for naturaliza-
tion. From this it is argued that Oongress adopted and re-
enacted the rule of the Schwimmer, Macintosh and Bland 
Oases .••• 
"It is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence 
alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law. We do not 
think under the circumstances of this legislative history that 
we can properly place on the shoulders of Congress the burden 
of the Court's own error. The history of the 1940 Aet is at 
most equivocal. It contains no affirmative recognition of the 
rule of the Schwimmer, Macintosh and Bland Oases. The 
silence of Congress and its inaction are as consistent with a 
desire to leave the problem fluid as they are with an adoption 
by silence of the rule of those cases." (66 S.Ot. 826, 830.) 
The foregoing statement is particularly applicable here, 
where it is contended that the silence of the Le",oislature in 
1945 establishes the intention of the Legislature that enacted 
the provision some eight years previously. even though ad-
ministrative construction antedating the Green ease and in 
contradiction with it was followed by reenactment of the 
section without change. It would be as logical to contend that 
the Legislature thereby adopted the administrative construe-
tion. Although legislative silence may sometimes give a elue 
to legislative intention, it is by no means conclusive. (Whit-
comb Hotel, Inc. v. Oalifornia Emp. Oom., 24 CaI.2d 753, 756-
758 [151 P.2d 233, 155 A.L.R. 405].) 
The conclusion that legislative silence constitutes approval 
of what the courts have done, as Mr. Justice Rutledge so aptly 
stated in his concurring opinion in Cleveland v. United States, 
-- U.S. - [67 S.Ot. 13, 17, 91 L.Ed. -], "must be 
derived by a form of negative inference, a process lending 
itself to much guesswork." 
This view is forcefully amplified in that opinion as follows: 
"There are vast differences between legislating by doing 
BOthing and leaisIating by positive enactment, both in the 
, 
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,processes by which the will of Congress is derived and stated 
.and in the clarity and certainty of the expression of its will. 
And there are many reasons, other than to indicate approval 
of what the courts have done, why Congress may fail to take 
affirmative action to repudiate their misconstruction of its 
duly adopted laws. Among them may be the sheer pressure 
of other and more important business. (See MODre v. Cleve-
land R. Co. (C.C.A. 6th) 108 F.2d 656, 6S0.) At times political 
considerations may work to forbid taking corrective action. 
And in such eases, as well as others, there may be a strong and 
proper tendency to trust to the courts to correct their own 
errors, see Girouard v. United Statu, lUpt"a, as they ought to 
do when experience has confirmed or demonstrated the error's 
uistenee. 
"The danger of imputing to Congress, as a result of its 
failure to take positive or affirmative action through normal 
legislative processes, ideas entertained by the Court concerning 
. Congress' will, is illustrated most dramatically perhaps by the 
vacillating and contradictory courses pursued in the Ion!! line 
of decisions imputing to 'the silence of Congress' varied ef-
fects in commerce clause eases. That danger may be and 
often is equally present in others. More often than not the 
only safe assumption to make from Congress' inaction is 
simply that Congress does not intend to act at all. (Cf. United 
8tatu v. American Tf"'UCking Auoe .• 310 U.S. 534, 550 rSO 
S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345].) At best the contrary view can 
be only an inference, altogether lacking in the normal evi-
dences of legislative intent and often subject to varying views 
of that intent. In short, although recognizing that by silence 
Congress at times may be taken to acquiesce and thus ap-
prove, we should be very sure that, under all the circum-
stances of a given situation, it has done 80 before we so rule 
and thus at once relieve ourselves from and shift to it the 
burden of correcting what we have done wrongly. The matter 
is particular, not general, notwithstanding earlier exceptional 
treatment and more recent tendency. Just as dubious legis-
lative history is at time much overridden, so also is silence or 
inaction often mistaken for legislation." 
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 17, 
1947. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a 
I~ 
